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FINANCIAL LITERACY OR FINANCIAL CASTIGATION? 
john A.E. Pottow* 
This year, the Canadians- through their government-convened 
Task Force on Financial Literacy - have proudly produced, 
"Canadians and their Money: Building a Brighter Financial 
Future." 1 Armed with 30 recommendations, its most dramatic 
innovation is to recommend the creation of a Financial Literacy 
Leader. I have been asked to provide an American perspective on 
this report specifically and the broader agenda of "financial 
literacy" more generally as a consumer welfare intervention. 
Let me start by acknowledging the critiques of the Canadian 
Task Force. For example, my Canadian colleague, Saul Schwartz, 
has already drafted a compelling analysis of the political economy 
behind the report and presented a devastating juxtaposition of the 
testimony made available to the task force with the summary and 
syntheses in the report itself. 2 It is not flattering. I also recognize 
the dizzying array of Canadian government and community 
institutions already in existence, including the Financial 




University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Matt Monahan for research 
assistance and Jacob Ziegel for comments. 
Task Force on Financial Literacy, Canadians and their Money: Building a 
Brighter Financial Future (Ottawa, 2010) ("Task Force Report"), available at 
<http://www .ftnancialliteracyincanada.com >. 
I will add to Saul's analysis that the strong voice of the banks in disclaiming 
ultimate responsibility is present. See id., at p. 20 ("Governments can help create 
the right financial environment through appropriate policies and regulations, but 
the burden of making financial decisions ultimately rests with individuals.") 
(quotation from TD Bank Financial Group). This evasion of responsibility is in 
the face of the Report's conclusion of the need for "shared responsibility." See id. 
("We believe that financial literacy is a matter of shared responsibility among 
many stakeholders, and have made it a key aspect of the National Strategy."); 
see also Jacob Ziegel, "Consumer Insolvencies, Consumer Credit, and 
Responsible Lending," in J. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law 
2009 (Toronto, Carswell, 2010), p. 343 (noting need for shared responsibility); 
lain Ramsay, "From Truth in Lending to Responsible Lending" (International 
Association of Consumer Law, Research Paper, 2008) (documenting developing 
socio-legal norm of responsible lending). online: <http://www.iaclaw.org/ 
Research_papers/Tru thinlendingtoresponsi blelending. pdf> ; Jean Braucher, 
"Responsible Lending as an Emerging International Norm," Credit Slips, 
online: <http:/ fwww.creditslips.org/creditslips/20 II /06/responsible-lending-as-
an-emerging-international-norm.html >. For an earlier discussion of responsi-
ble lending and its need for application in the United States, see John A.E. 
Pottow, "Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending," 2007 U. III. L. 
Rev. 405. 
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of Canada, the Financial Planning Standards Council, the Investor 
Education Fund, and the National Advisory Council. 3 That said, I 
come to praise the report, not to bury it. For it is only in contrast 
to the demoralizing state of affairs in the United States that one 
can appreciate just how far ahead the Canadians actually are.4 
Thus, the comparative analysis is that the Canadians' glass is half-
full. To be sure, there are still glaring deficiencies on both sides of 
the border that warrant further comment. I propose addressing 
those deficiencies in part through a call to arms for greater 
financial castigation rather than financial literacy education. 
The United States. has taken a heavy-handed approach to 
financial education in the 2005 BAPCPA legislation. 5 In addition to 
mandatory pre-filing "credit counseling" (which in turn contains a 
considerable financial education component), there is a mandatory 
pre-discharge debtor education course.6 The apparent belief of the 
enacting Congress was that these educational interventions would 
reduce the number of bankruptcy filings, the stated aim of the 
legislation. 7 So far, the results have been uninspiring. Even the 
3. The United States has a Federal Financial Literacy and Education Commission. 
See "Financial Literacy and Education Commission" (2011), U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, online: <http:jjwww.treasury.govjresource-centerjfinancial-educa-
tionjPagesjcommission-index.aspx >. This was presumably deemed insufficient 
to prevent the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
4. One striking difference is Schwartz's hostility to the proposed Financial Literacy 
Leader in Canada- as being a patsy of no real power- and the groundswell of 
opposition to the still-unconfirmed head of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau in the United States - as an unstopple regulatory czar of unparalleled 
administrative powers. See Richard Shelby, "44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No 
Accountability, No Confirmation" Richard Shelby, United States Senator of 
Alabama (May 5, 2011), online: <http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ 
20 II /5/44-u-s-sens-to-obama-no-accountability-no-confirmation >: 
The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB director unprecedented authority over 
financial institutions and main street businesses. The CFPB director will have 
vast rule-making, supervisory, investigative and enforcement powers and 
the authority to regulate any person or business that offers or sells a 
"financial product or service." This authority will extend to not just 
traditional financial institutions, but also potentially thousands of entre-
preneurs and small businesses. 
5. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C.). 
6. See II U.S.C. § l09(h) (2006) (pre-petition credit counseling requirement); II 
U.S.C. § 727(a)(ll) (2006) (pre-discharge debtor education course). 
7. See 151 Cong. Rec. S.l856 (daily ed., March l, 2005) (statement of Sen. C. 
Grassley) ("So that I am crystal clear, people who do not have the ability to 
repay their debts can still use the bankruptcy system as they would have 
before. The bill clearly provides that people of limited income can still file 
under chapter 7 and get that fresh start ... so their debts can be wiped away, 
as is done right now."); "George W. Bush: Remarks at the Signing of 
396 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 51 
U.S. government itself in its first report assessing these BAPCPA 
counseling and education requirements unenthusiastically 
proclaimed their efficacy "not clear. "8 
Scholars have already questioned the wisdom of mandatory 
financial education courses.9 More broadly, others, under the lead 
of Lauren Willis, have launched a greater attack on financial 
education as a method of enhancing consumer welfare, arguing 
quite forcefully and persuasively that policymakers sublimate 
reformist impulses into a mantra of "more financial education" as 
a politically expedient alternative to substantive reform (such as, 
e.g., reconsideration of usury laws). 10 This reflects at best 
Pollyanna-ism and at worst subterfuge. While Willis may be at 
times too uncharitable - other studies have found at least some 
behaviour modification successfully brought about through 
financial literacy programmes 11 - she is surely correct in her 
political assessment (not to mention her painstaking 
methodological critiques). 12 
The inefficacy to date of the financial education efforts 
spearheaded by BAPCPA is not surprising. What is more unusual 
is the depth of the denial that has taken stranglehold over U.S. 
policymakers. There are two principal revelations of this denial I 
offer for comparative reflection: first, the "regulatory mindset" to 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act" in John T. 
Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara, 
April 20, 2005), online: The American Presidency Project <http:ffwww.pre-
sidency.ucsb.edufwsjindex.php?pid = 63247#axzzl RpMs8Bg6 > ("[T]oo many 
people have abused the bankruptcy laws. They've walked away from debts 
even when they had the ability to repay them .... Under the new law, 
Americans who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at least a 
portion of their debts."). 
8. See United States Government Accountability Office, GA0-07-203, Report to 
Congressional Requesters: Bankruptcy Reform: Value of Credit Counseling 
Requirement Is Not Clear (Washington, D.C., Government Accountability 
Office, 2007). 
9. One prominent skeptic is Lewis Mandell, designer of Jump$tart. See, e.g., Lewis 
Mandell, "Financial 'Education in High School" in Overcoming the Saving Slump: 
How to Increase the Effectiveness of Financial Education and Saving Programs, 
Annamaria Lusardi, ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
10. See Lauren E. Willis, "Against Financial-Literacy Education" (2008), 94 Iowa L. 
Rev. 197, p. 265. 
II. For example, see the studies discussed in Richard Wiener et a!., "Debtor 
Education, Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation" (2005), 23 
Behav. Sci. Law 347, p. 364. 
12. For a meticulous unpacking of the methodology of the studies touting the 
benefits of financial literacy education, see Lauren E. Willis, "Evidence and 
Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education" (2009}, 
46 San Diego L. Rev. 415. 
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incentive-crafting legislation inherent in BAPCPA (in contrast to the 
Canadian Task Force Report); and second, the blithe ignorance of 
failure reflected in the most recent U.S. assessment of BAPCPA's 
financial education efforts. 
Consider first what I have called the regulatory mindset. Susan 
Block-Lieb and Ted Janger published a wonderful analysis of the 
homo economus ambitions behind BAPCPA, coupled with compelling 
argument that not only are consumers irrational (or perhaps 
boundedly rational) participants in the credit markets, but that a 
stable equilibrium can be and has been reached with lenders 
exploiting those biases, even in highly competitive environments, 
as a form of regressive rent-seeking. 13 BAPCPA was designed upon a 
full-throated belief that consumer debtor conduct could be crafted 
with an assortment of carrots and sticks (mostly sticks): by 
harshening the bankruptcy discharge, filings would be reduced 
through changes in consumer conduct. 14 Subsequent empirical 
research has shown this assumption to be painfully misguided, and 
the ensuing collapse of financial markets both heightened attention 
to this market's shortcomings and fueled demand for greater 
government regulation. 15 
Contrast this wooden approach to the Canadians' insistence on 
taking heed of cautions flowing from the field of behavioural law 
and economics, "[T]he Task Force has taken a close look at 
'behavioural economics', a field of study that looks at factors 
influencing financial behaviour to understand how people make 
decisions about their money." 16 Hyperbolic discounting, to pick 
one popular application, is discussed in the task force report 
explicitly; not so in BAPCPA. 17 Thus, at least from the American 
perspective, it seems that the Canadian approach is being more 
realistic in predicting the mechanisms of consumer conduct in 
suggesting financial reform. 
To be sure, the picture is not so starkly pro-Canadian as I paint. 
For example, the recent Dodd-Frank Act's Consumer Financial 
13. See Susan Block-Lieb and Edward J. Janger, "The Myth of the Rational 
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided 'Reform' of Bank-
ruptcy Law" (2006), 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1481. 
14. See generally Robert M. Lawless et a/., "Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors" (2008), 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 349. 
15. See Block-Lieb and Janger, supra, footnote 13, at p. 1481; see also G. Ray 
Warner, "Bankruptcy Reform and Economic Recovery" (2010), 25 J. Civ. Rts. & 
Econ. Dev. 181. 
16. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 54. 
17. See id. ("Choices that do not have immediate relevance (e.g., saving for 
retirement) may be delayed to a future time, despite their importance."). 
398 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 51 
Protection Bureau is told in its enabling legislation to undertake 
considerations of behavioural law and economics. 18 (This is surely 
Michael Barr and Elizabeth Warren's influence, and note that Cass 
Sunstein is head of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs). 19 And the Canadians, while recognizing the need for 
greater simplicity,20 have not yet come up with an implementing 
solution other than exhortation. Consider that since 200 l, the 
Bank Act's regulations already required "clear and straightforward 
language" in consumer lending documents, policed by the 
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada.21 Yet few would argue 
loan documents since then have been clear. As such, it is uncertain 
further injunctions to "improve language and presentation"22 will 
have any greater effect. Cynically, one is reminded of the European 
Union's new Proposal on Mortgage Lending, which includes draft 
disclosure language in simple English for loan documents warning 
borrowers, "Your income may change. "23 Still, the deeper trend is 
surely prevalent: the Canadian Task Force's regulatory mindset is 
to recognize and embrace the imperfection of the consumer rather 
than remain in the thrall of long-discredited beliefs of rational 
consumer action. 
The second revelation of U.S. denial is in the Justice 
Department's 2008 Report to Congress on the "Evaluation of 
Instructional Classes in Personal Financial Management for 
Consumer Bankruptcy Debtors."24 It's a doozy. (Actually, I 
18. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1013(b)(I)(E) (2010) (directing the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau to conduct research on "consumer behavior with respect to 
consumer financial products or services"); Credit Card Accountability Respon-
sibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 § 301 
(2009) (changing certification requirements for financial literacy courses for 
young consumer to take account of the course's "proven track record in 
producing changed consumer behavior"). 
19. See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, "Making Credit Safer" (2008), 157 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. I; Michael S. Barr et a/., "The Case for Behaviorally Informed 
Regulation" in The Behavioral Foundations of Policy, Eldar Shafir, ed. (New 
York, Russell Sage Foundation Press and Princeton University, 2007); Richard 
H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008). 
20. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 56. 
21. See id. at p. 72. 
22. See id. 
23. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property, COM (2011) 142 
final (March 31, 2011), p. 51. 
24. U.S. Department of Justice, "Report to Congress: Evaluation of Instructional 
Classes in Personal Financial Management for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtors" 
(Washington, D.C., 2008) ("DOJ Report"). 
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believe the proper colloquialism might be "boondoggle," at least 
for Abt Associates, the consulting service firm to which the project 
was outsourced.)25 The report's conclusion proudly trumpets: 
Almost all of the consumer bankruptcy debtors (97%) in the pilot study who 
took the course utilizing the financial management training curriculum and 
materials developed for the EousT [Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee] 
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the curriculum. Further, almost 
half of the consumer bankruptcy debtors in the ~ilot study reported their 
intention to change at least one financial practice. 6 
Yet the report then sheepishly tucks in what it suggests is the 
only less glowing finding: "The pilot study did not, however, find 
substantial improvement in knowledge and financial practices," 
which it explains away as "likely due to pre-existing knowledge 
regarding the topics measured. "27 
The U.S. Report sounds like debtor education classes are 
mostly, perhaps unambiguously, a success. But that rosy spin 
requires further scrutiny. Three metrics of gauging success were 
used: self-report of student satisfaction; knowledge improvement 
on a "financial skills" questionnaire, and a two-part conduct 
review, based first on a statement of intentions regarding future 
financial behaviour and second on a follow-up review six months 
later.28 Careful readers should initially question whether all three 
criteria should be weighted equally. While I am all for using 
triangulation of multiple datapoints in conducting empirical 
investigations, surely we should be more interested in whether a 
financial education course actually affected the debtor's 
subsequent financial life than whether she was happy, as a 
matter of psychic utility, that she took the course? (Perhaps I 
reveal my own crabbed conception of the goals of financial 
education by unfairly shortchanging the "feel-good" payoff.) 
Indeed, were we to rank the metrics in ascending order of 
relevance, surely most would agree they track the order presented: 
Did you like being educated in financial literacy; did you learn 
anything; did you learn anything that is going to make you want to 
change your life after bankruptcy; and did you learn anything that 
is actually going to make you change your life after bankruptcy? 
25. The DOJ Report itself is only six pages; the massive Exhibit I is the Abt Associates 
report, which is duly padded with plenty of graphics and subject headings, 
exhaustively cataloguing debtor experiences with the mandatory financial 
education courses. 
26. !d. at p. 6. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. at p. 4. 
400 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 51 
Reframed thus, the results from the U.S. study are less 
encouraging than the consultants' conclusions portend. True, 
while 97% of debtor-students reported being satisfied, 29 only a 
smaller percentage (between zero- zero!- and 15% depending 
on estimates) improved their scores on the same test administered 
before and after the course. 30 (The test itself was an easy to-
question true/false one that resulted in a score of nine or ten out of 
ten for 36-47% of respondents- pre-course.) The report authors 
interpret the at-best modest improvement in scores after the 
financial education course as evidence that many debtors knew all 
this stuff already, not that the course added little value. 
As for the most important criterion - did anything change as a 
result- the report's data do not inspire. Only 44% of respondents 
reported an intention to change any one of 10 "financial habits."31 
In other words, more than half had no inclination to change at all. 
(Without getting too into the details - I refer the reader to the 
U.S. Report itself- it is far from clear that all these "financial 
habits" should be coded equally; because of the ordinal ranking, 
"compare prices before making purchases" earns the same 
treatment as "save money regularly" and "reduce impulse 
spending and cut unnecessary spending. ")32 It gets worse -
some of the debtors financially regressed, such that they on balance 
planned to worsen their financial conduct afterward, and so these 
"decelerations" (as the report calls them) would require reducing 
the 44% gross estimate above. Now the coup de grace: only at best 
half of the "intenders" actually followed through and altered their 
conduct within six months, such that, as an upward bound, fewer 
than one-quarter of debtors actually had any material change to 
conduct as a result of the mandated course.33 Seventy-five percent 
were unaffected in any meaningful way. 
The simple explanation for the sunny tone of the report's 
conclusions is that Abt wanted to be the harbinger of good news. 
Everyone likes success. But surely the deeper reason is the attitude 
of denial that has taken hold in the United States - the near-
unshakable belief that financial literacy and education is the low-
cost panacea to consumer financial distress. 34 With this 
29. !d. at p. 5. 
30. !d. 
31. !d. at p. 26. 
32. !d. at p. 5. 
33. /d. at pp. 41-42. 
34. See Willis, supra, footnote 10, at p. 197. 
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preconception, tt ts unsurprising the report's authors found the 
glass one-tenth full rather than mostly empty. 
If financial literacy education- especially for students forcibly 
conscripted through withholding of the bankruptcy discharge - is 
not the most efficacious policy intervention, what might be better? 
I have a modest proposal to sketch out in only the most barebones 
of form, linking together the works of psychologist Richard 
Weiner and law professor and advocate Nathalie Martin.35 It can 
be summarized thus: it is time to capitalize on base, raw emotion. 
More specifically, I want to make the perhaps unpopular 
suggestion that we need to terrorize debtors more. Rather than 
financial education, we should have more financial castigation. This 
policy argument builds in two parts, and it rests on a seeming 
contradiction that l will try to resolve. 
The first part of the argument is simply an acknowledgement of 
the powerful role of emotion in consumer spending and borrowing 
decisions. The works of Richard Wiener and his co-authors 
document extensively how some consumers self-medicate ("mood 
repair") through consumption patterns. What is even more 
illuminating are their findings on not just the inefficacy - but 
the sometimes backfiring mood enhancements - of attempts at 
financial education and disclosure. For example, Wiener finds that 
enhanced disclosure warnings to consumers about to embark on a 
simulated shopping spree did have some effect at curbing intended 
spending (in contrast to garden-variety disclosures), but for the 
subset of consumers who admitted to shopping to end bad moods, 
the enhanced disclosures correlated with more credit card 
purchasing -- what he calls a "boomerang effect" 36 -
suggesting perhaps that the disclosure enraged, or perhaps 
merely stultified, these mood-dependent shoppers.37 Moreover, 
as for "financial literacy" simpliciter, he finds a low correlation 
between financial literacy test scores and intended purchasing 
patterns. Thus, one important implication of Wiener's work is that 
financial education aimed at rationally educating debtors to 
35. See Richard L. Wiener et al., "Psychology and BAPCPA: Enhanced Disclosure and 
Emotion" (2006), 71 Mo. L. Rev. 1003; Nathalie Martin and Ocean Tama y 
Sweet, "Mind Games: Rethinking BAPCPA's Debtor Education Provisions" (2007), 
31 S. Ill. U.L.J. 517. 
36. See Wiener, ibid., at p. 1031. 
37. See id. at p. 1011. This study is complex, and I am picking only highlights. For 
instance, the suggestion above in the text that the mood mediation might be rage 
is too quick; Wiener finds an increase in both positive and negative emotions for 
"shopaholics" after reading the enhanced disclosures. /d. at p. 1031. 
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change their conduct upon seasoned reflection - the theoretical 
core of BAPCPA- may be a fool's errand.38 
The second part of the argument takes seriously the work of 
Nathalie Martin that details her experiences with and 
recommendations for consumer finance classes. 39 She has her 
own kindred call to arms for shock and awe in scaring consumers 
into fear of credit. In her own colourful words, "Given the 
physiological, psychological, and cultural factors influencing the 
use of consumer credit, as well as the industry's successful efforts 
to indoctrinate American thinking about what is desirable and 
affordable, in my view, nothing short of kamikaze tactics will 
do."40 Indeed, Martin's findings are consistent with Willis' (and. 
others')41 that many of the seemingly successful financial 
education courses studied to date may actually owe their success 
not due to the direct content of the information conveyed but due 
to their collateral consequences, such as individual counseling with 
an instructor, or pre-commitment techniques, such as cutting up 
credit cards. (Willis calls these the "noneducative components" of 
financial literacy education.)42 Accordingly, my recommendation 
upon synthesizing the multitude of studies best exemplified by 
Weiner and Martin is that rather than informing debtors with 
mind-numbing curricula on how to calculate interest rates, we 
should be scaring the pants off them about how quickly credit 
cards can spiral out of control and drive people into bankruptcy.43 
38. This conclusion should not be overstated. In other work, Wiener finds that 
financial literacy can be effective. See, e.g., Wiener, supra, footnote II, at p. 347 
(finding improved knowledge scores by "trained" debtors taking financial literacy 
course, but cautioning that those debtors did not show significant change in 
conduct, such as their credit card balances or number paying more than 
minimum balance). 
39. See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 517. 
40. !d. at p. 541. 
41. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, "An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in 
Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter l3 Completion Not Shown" (2001), 9 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 557. 
42. See Willis, supra, footnote 10, at p. 206. Indeed, it could be that we are talking 
past each other in a debate on nomenclature. For example, is the success of just 
one community group I have studied recently - the Wisconsin Women's 
Business Initiative Corp. - in teaching financial education a result of the direct 
curriculum, or the hands-on, community-building ethos that is its "non-
educative" aspect? See "Education & Workshops", Wisconsin Women's Business 
initiative Corp., online: < https://wwbic.comj?q =education-workshops>. 
Building upon this, it is interesting that the Canadian Task Force recommenda-
tions include, e.g., such noneducative components as face-to-face pre-counseling 
requirements. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 42. 
43. See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 540 ("(W]hy teach the wise use of credit, 
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"A little fear can be very helpful."44 (One doubts the industry will 
be an enthusiastic sponsor of this sort of intervention.)45 
Now the seeming tension: is there a disconnect between, on the 
one hand, bemoaning the inefficacy of financial education courses 
and, on the other, offering recommendations for a re-design of 
their curricula? If Willis is right that this is all a waste of time 
(other than, perhaps, math skills),46 then why bother listening to 
Martin? The answer is on the just-discussed distinction between 
cognition and emotion. The revised purpose of the financial 
education courses would not be for their direct content, but for 
their indirect effect of engaging participants' emotions, re-
conditioning them to develop genuine fear of the consequences 
of overindebtedness. Think of all the gory car crash photographs 
presented in driver education courses - the visceral reaction is 
intended and likely effective. (Indeed, Canadians are well known 
for their use of frightening and flaccid cigarette label graphics.) 
Why not add stories of "people becoming terminally ill, homeless 
or even suicidal as a result of debt"?47 Any tension that might seem 
to arise from this loosely formed proposal is thus more apparent 
than real. In sum, I agree with Martin, "My theory is that strong 
negative emotions are necessary to counteract the industry's highly 
effective tactics to encourage harmful spending. "48 
instead of the danger of paying compound interest and the importance of 
saving?"). 
44. See id., at p. 544. Note that Wiener's findings of "boomerang" reactions could 
suggest that the negative affect influence enhanced disclosures had on mood 
shoppers could lead to a backfire of my proposal. The easy response to this issue 
is to observe my curriculum would be terror-based and possibly invoke wholly 
different emotions than those measured on the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) metric used in his study. The harder response is to try to 
disentangle the different roles of positive and negative emotion in mediating and 
moderating consumption habits, a question Wiener himself wrestles with in his 
analysis. 
45. I was disappointed to learn that this brilliant witticism had effectively been made 
already by Martin and Sweet. See id., at p. 540, note 138 ("We suspect that the 
consumer credit industry lobbyists that supported BAPCPA would not want 
individual consumers to earn interest rather than pay interest."). 
46. Lauren E. Willis, "Financial Education: Lessons Not Learned & Lessons 
Learned" (Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2011-22), online: <http:// 
papers.ssrn.comfsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id = 1869313## >. 
47. See Martin and Sweet, supra, footnote 35, at p. 544. 
48. See id., at p. 543. A somewhat cognate inquiry involves norm-construction on 
thrift. Can emotional manufacturing generate increased thrift? The Canadian 
Task Force report touches on thrift. See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra, footnote 
1, at p. 57 (discussing the need to reform a "culture that tends to encourage 
consumption and immediate gratification"); id., at p. 64 (likening norm-
construction to the 1970s' ParticipACTION public service announcement campaign, 
404 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 51 
What about progressivity? For example, if the cause of financial 
distress is divorced from volitional conduct but is simply the 
unhappy consequence of being poor, then what good does it do to 
hector these unfortunates with fire-breathing sermons on the evils 
of credit? Martin worries about this herself,49 explicitly 
distinguishing recommendations she has for middle class debtors 
from those for debtors in poverty.5° Consider too that the Abt 
report finds 83% of debtors attributed an unexpected/unavoidable 
change in financial circumstance as a cause of bankruptcy, with a 
majority of that majority- 64%- citing the exogenous change 
as being the sole cause, i.e., occurring in the absence of any 
problems with financial management. 51 This may explain the non-
correlation between cause of bankruptcy and financial literacy test 
score.52 Indeed, the Canadian Task Force report finds that many 
people's financial literacy "problems" involve nothing other than 
being poor. For example, one of the categories in its National 
Financial Literacy Index is "making ends meet," for which it finds 
as a demographic matter, I submit unsurprisingly, that "low-
income and low-net-worth households" are scoring poorly. 53 
While it seems senselessly cruel to beat up on the already 
downtrodden, I nonetheless want to double-down on my proposal 
(parting ways with my kindred spirit Martin) and insist that even 
the poor, too, should be subjected to some genuine terror on the 
risks of consumer credit. This impulse is driven by a couple factors. 
with catchy slogans such as "0-10-300"). The United States even has a think tank 
dedicated to studying thrift. See John Templeton Center for Thrift and 
Generosity, online: NewThrift.org <http://newthrift.org/aboutf>; A. Mechele 
Dickerson, "Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit-Focused 
Debtor Education May Not Work" (1999), 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 945. These 
important considerations - including macro-economic ramifications - are 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
49. See Martin, supra, footnote 35, at p. 544 ("Such [scare] tactics would likely be too 
harsh for bankruptcy debtors, who already have seen financial tragedy, but are 
useful for people who have not yet encountered bankruptcy."). 
50. See id., at p. 541. 
51. See DOJ Report, supra, footnote 24, at p. 49. 
52. See id. Only 10% of respondents listed poor financial management/decision-
making on its own (not in combination with an exogenous shock) as the reason 
for bankruptcy. The report authors cautiously say this number might be too low 
because of self-serving responses, but their data seem in general accordance with 
other studies. See Lawless et a/., supra, footnote 14, at p. 387 (addressing in 
methodological appendix self-serving response bias concerns and concluding they 
are likely minimal in a context of court filings that are made under oath). 
53. Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at p. 14. The U.S. report ranks "pay bills 
on time each month" as a financial skill. See DOJ Report, supra, footnote 24, at p. 
41. It is unclear whether consumers who do not do so have failed in their financial 
educations or simply face unwanted liquidity constraints. 
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First, even low-income consumers need to be made aware of the 
risks of consumer credit products. My desire is not to drive people 
from credit cards into the open arms of loan sharks, but to make 
them recognize the similarities between credit cards and loan 
sharks- debiasing them from the imprimatur of helpfulness and 
solicitude that attach to the former's direct mailing brochures. 54 
Second, as a rough justice cut at getting the word out and maybe 
even changing social consumption norms, I would rather sacrifice 
the heightened precision of "message discrimination" than engage 
in the costly sorting of who needs to hear the message from who 
does not. Is making a non-smoker look at revolting images of 
nicotine-laden lungs all that costly? Probably not. (This is 
speculation at best, of course, but that probably places me no 
worse off than the median legislator.) As such, while I take the 
concerns of progressivity seriously, I nevertheless counsel broad-
sweeping attempts at incentive-shaping through stark, scary 
lessons on the perils of credit. 
This brief commentary has discussed the U.S. enthusiasm 
toward financial education courses, outlining its fundamental 
embrace by BAPCPA and persistence in the face of even government-
sponsored research showing dubious results at best. It contrasted 
the Canadian Task Force Report, which, for all its shortcomings, 
at least recognizes the need for taking heed of behavioural law and 
economics and human imperfection more generally. In considering 
these experiences, it also offered the modest proposal that, rather 
than further reforming financial literacy classes, more energy 
should be devoted to an emotional assault on consumer credit: 
terrifying consumers that credit cards are not their friends but their 
profit-seeking enemies. Of course, it has no hope of passage into 
official policy in the face of a well-heeled credit lobby, but the idea 
can get out there, working its way through a populist network of 
ground-up consumer outreach workshops. 55 Whether this is 
branded curricular reform or starting something entirely new is a 
54. For the record, I would like to note my objection to the assumption of 
substitution effects. Many assume them, and some studies - not without 
controversy - have claimed to find them. Suffice it to say for this footnote on a 
topic beyond the scope of this article that much more work needs to be done 
before I am convinced. For a generic laying out of the argument, see, e.g., Todd J. 
Zywicki, "An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis" (2005), 99 
N.W.U.L.R. 1463. 
55. Consider that one of the recommendations of the Task Force's report is to give 
more funding to non-profit organizations to help debtor education on the 
community level. See Task Force Report, supra, footnote I, at pp. 22-23. 
406 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 51 
tangential matter of semantics. The important point is that it is 
time to replace antiseptic education with castigation and terror. 
